Sabine Roßmann 203 p. 255). In contrast to the peaceful and short-lived 'Orange Revolution', however, the three-month Euromaidan movement was soon mainly composed of 30-54-year-olds, making up between 49 per cent and 56 per cent of the total number of protesters.
2 Another thing that 'Orange Revolution' and Euromaidan have in common is that patriotism and nationalism were on the rise since the protests started. Because of the gendered nature of nationalism this creates 'a particularly difficult situation for women ' (Evangelista, 2011, p. 101) . Regardless of whether the nationalism is more civic or more ethnic, it tends 'to embrace tradition as a legitimating basis for nation-building and cultural renewal' -and this (whether real or invented) tradition is 'often patriarchal' (Nagel, 1998, p. 254) . This can lead to a maternalistic-nationalist discourse and, through it, to a 'retraditionalization of gender ideals' (Males in Phillips, 2014, p. 416 ) and a rejection of gender equality and feminism (see Shevchenko, 2014) . According to polls conducted on 7 and 8 December 2013, 57.2 per cent of protesters in Kiev were male; on 20 December their number on the barricades had risen to 85-88 per cent.
3 After the first violent riots women were only admitted in exceptional cases to the barricades at night and, in mid-February, as the situation was getting out of control, 'womenandchildren' (Enloe, 1990) were called upon to leave the fighting zone for good. Did the pro-European Euromaidan movement nevertheless manage to challenge existing gender relations and stereotypes? Did it contribute to the strengthening of a new feminist generation? Or did the new national revival, on the contrary, have an opposite and regressive influence on gender concepts in Ukraine? These questions will be touched on in this chapter.
(Classic) gender concepts in Ukrainian society
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union one can -alongside economic and political change -observe a newly strengthened turn towards 'traditional' gender roles in many former socialist states of Eastern Europe. The male is to be responsible for public space, the woman is to 'return [. . .] to the family' (Pavlychko, 1997, p. 222) , to take on her role as caring mother and housewife. This 'return to traditional patriarchal values of motherhood, sacrifice and submission ' (Bracewell, 1996, p. 29) appears to both the political elite and a majority of the population to be a welcome solution for 'women's distraction from the "natural" roles' (ibid., p. 29) -and the ensuing problem of a low birthrate and a threatened nuclear family. This also applies to Ukraine, whose society can be described as being 'characterized by gender roles that persist in traditional stereotypes ' (Gerasymenko, 2006, p. 383) . Even though in the schooling and education sector there seem to be no or only minor differences related to gender, just as there is no discriminating legislation in place, 'a comparison of women's and men's real opportunities and achievements in all spheres of public life shows significant gender problems' (ibid.,
